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In this issue...
The Bank of Canada must take careful account of the international
environment, where inflation-targeting has become widespread, as it
considers where Canada should go from here – once the current
inflation-control target agreement expires in 2011.
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MONETARY POLICYThis Commentary asks: how has the international experience with monetary policy
changed over the past decade or so? It considers the consequences of the spread of
inflation-control regimes worldwide in shaping where Canada goes from here –
once the current inflation-control-target agreement expires on December 31, 2011. 
At the heart of all inflation-targeting (IT) regimes is the core belief that a low and
stable inflation rate is a desirable goal. The fact that the public can be convinced of
the desirability of such a goal stems in no small measure from the emergence of a
consensus about the appropriate social utility function that ought to govern a
central bank’s actions. 
Inflation targeting has spread around the world. There is some diversity in what is
targeted, how this is accomplished, and over what time-horizon the chosen objective
is to be attained. The likely source of IT’s success is that this strategy is better able to
anchor inflationary expectations, and delivers the appropriate stance of monetary
policy in a more consistent manner. The paper points to the need to deal explicitly
with some questions about the Canadian economy’s performance under inflation
targeting, especially in light of the large shocks that have hit our economy in recent
years. For example, the Bank of Canada could be more explicit about how it might
pre-empt the consequences of stresses in the economy and the financial system to
avoid the accusation that it is an effective enabler of asset price bubbles. Accordingly,
this is a good time to reconsider the regime’s configuration. The principal lesson is
that the Bank must take careful account of the international environment in which
it has been and will be operating. The Bank’s failure to emphasize international
matters in 2006, when it set out its remit for reviewing the program, was a serious
omission. 
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T
his Commentary focuses on 
two interrelated issues. First,
how has the international
experience with monetary policy
changed over the past decade or so? 
It considers the consequences of the
spread of inflation-control regimes
worldwide in shaping where Canada
goes from here once the current
inflation-control-target agreement
expires on December 31, 2011. What
does this portend for the conduct of
monetary policy in Canada? Second,
as the date for the renewal of Canada’s
inflation targeting regime approaches,
what elements of the existing policy
regime deserve attention? 
In particular, policy questions that may have been
overlooked, based on an assessment of the
international experience, will be addressed. The
objective, of course, is to evaluate and, if necessary,
to improve how well the current monetary policy
strategy is able to not only deliver low and stable
inflation, but to buttress itself against the potential
criticism that, in the face of recent shocks and
crises in the world economy, more wholesale
change to Canada’s regime is required.
There is a sense in which policymakers in
Canada can be accused of complacency about the
potential threats from abroad, and possibly from
within, that could threaten the survival of the
monetary policy regime in its present form. Lulled
into the belief that it is enough to have a coherent
but domestically oriented monetary policy regime,
and focused on an explicit inflation-control 
target and a floating exchange rate, they may not
adequately take into account external pressures. For
example, the history of the Canadian dollar, ably
documented by Powell (1999), suggests that, while
policymakers at home have historically preferred a
floating exchange rate regime, events beyond their
control have on several occasions forced our
country away from the free float only to return to
it, often when the international cooperation or
coordination required to make alternative monetary
regimes function, breaks down.1
Since Canada is on the periphery of economies
that will dictate the make-up and structure of
future international monetary relations, the
prospect of deciding what happens after 2011 gives
Canada’s policymakers the opportunity not only to
take a look back but to improve on a policy that,
since 1991, has consistently delivered lower
average inflation than in the US or the euro area.
They should not shy away from more prominently
defending its virtues on the world stage, or
considering potential avenues for improvement,
lest it is trampled by an imminent desire on the
part of major economic powers to construct a new
international monetary order not entirely suited to
Canada’s economic needs.2
As this is written, the financial shock that
originated in the US, and spread worldwide, has
prompted renewed calls for greater policy
cooperation, if not coordination, seemingly
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An earlier version of this paper was presented at the C.D. Howe Institute Policy Conference: Canada’s Monetary Policy Regime after 2011. Comments
on an earlier draft by Andy Filardo, Charles Goodhart, Robert Hetzel, Peter Howitt, David Laidler, and Andrew Spence, are gratefully acknowledged. 
I am also grateful to Nergiz Dincer for providing me with the data used in Dincer and Eichengreen (2007). Results not presented in the main body of 
the paper are relegated to an online technical appendix available at http://www.wlu.ca/sbe/psiklos (Research). A previous draft was presented at the
Sixth HKIMR workshop, August 2008. Parts of this paper were completed while I was Bundesbank Professor at the Freie Universität, Berlin.
1 The return to Bretton Woods in May 1962 is an example of the pressure placed on Canada to follow some international standard. Bretton
Woods, of course, collapsed in the early 1970s and, following a period of managed floating, the Canadian dollar freely floats to this day.
Possibly one exception suggesting that Canada can go it alone is the decision in 1950 to float. Nevertheless, here too there was quiet assent
given to this decision by the international community, especially the United States. 
2 Paul Volcker is one influential policymaker who not only regrets the end of Bretton Woods but continues to imagine a future that includes
more international central bank policy coordination. See, for example, Volcker and Gyohten (1992, Chapter 8).oblivious to the mechanisms that currently exist
among central banks, in particular, to carry out
necessary interventions.3
The Current Environment
In 2009, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand
celebrates 20 years of inflation targeting (hereafter
IT). Canada’s turn comes in 2011. The record of
inflation in Canada over the past decade relative to
the US experience is impressive, as seen in Figure 1.
With very few exceptions, Canada’s inflation rate 
has been below that of the US since 1991, when IT
was introduced. Indeed, the cumulative inflation
advantage Canada has enjoyed over the US, between
the second quarter of 1991 and the end of 2007, is
almost 45 percent; not an insignificant figure.4
The Remarkable Story of Canadian
Inflation
Figure 2 plots inflation objectives in Canada,
alongside a selection of inflation forecasts, since
1991 when IT was introduced. For the most part,
expectations of inflation have remained inside 
the target bands, especially since 1995 when the 
1-3 percent corridor was established and thereafter
left untouched. Moreover, whenever a forecast
breached the target, it did not take long before
expectations returned inside the target range. In
addition, long-term inflationary expectations, as
proxied by the difference between the yields on
long-term government bonds and on inflation-
indexed government bonds, have remained well
within the inflation-control objectives since 1997.
Notice, however, that there continues to be some
disagreement about inflationary expectations
throughout the period examined. Less celebrated
perhaps has been the durability of the regime,
particularly as policy regimes that preceded IT
since World War II showed themselves unable to
match its success in this regard.
Since 1989, when inflation reduction targets were
introduced in New Zealand, this type of policy
framework has spread throughout the world. There
are now almost 30 countries that target inflation in
a more or less formal fashion.5 Several other central
banks, most notably the United States, Switzerland,
and the euro area are considered to be de facto
adherents to a policy of IT. It is also the case (see
Appendix A) that the degree of economic and
political independence of central banks in IT
economies is significantly higher than in economies
that have chosen not to adopt this kind of monetary
policy strategy. This reflects a political decision in
these countries to provide the means for their
central banks to do what central banks have claimed
all along to be designed to do, namely fight inflation
(Siklos 2002).
There are a number of remarkable features
about how this state of affairs has emerged over
time. The adoption of IT was not normally the
consequence of some economic or financial crisis
in the countries that, early on, chose to adopt this
strategy, although, in some instances, a crisis did
help to motivate policymakers to consider the
adoption of an explicit inflation objective.6
Repeated banking crises in earlier decades led to
the creation of the Basel Committee, and greater
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3 Perhaps the most recent expression of the need for more coordinated intervention comes from the IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report
(2008a). This report acknowledges the reality of what central banks (e.g., as in the case of the US Federal Reserve) have worried about for
several months; namely the emergence of an “adverse feedback loop,” wherein tight credit conditions are further reinforced by weakening 
global economic performance. 
4 In US policy circles the preferred inflation indicator is the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) deflator, which is not, strictly speaking,
comparable to the CPI. 
5 According to Rose (2007, Appendix A) 27 countries adopted inflation targets by 2006. If we subtract Finland and Spain, both of whom joined EMU,
add Kazakhstan and Albania to the list, the total remains the same. In addition, the IMF (2006) estimates that there are 33 other countries expected to
adopt IT in the next 5 years or so. This implies that potentially a third of all countries around the world will have adopted a version of this monetary
policy strategy.
6 New Zealand might be an exception since inflation became high and unstable during the 1980s. Nevertheless, it must be kept in mind that IT was
introduced to that country almost four years after the NZ dollar began to float, and after a large number of fiscal and other structural reforms were
enacted. In a sense IT represented the culmination of wrenching changes to the New Zealand economy. See Reserve Bank of New Zealand (1992).Commentary 292 | 3
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Figure 1: Inflation in Canada and in the US in the Inflation Targeting Era
Notes: Inflation in Canada is the year-over-year percent change in the CPI (CANSIM v41690914). For the US the series, the CPI for all urban consumers (series CPIAUSL),
















Figure 2: Varieties of Inflation and Inflation Expectations Indicators for Canada
Notes: Target ranges are from Siklos (2008a). Headline inflation is CPI inflation (see notes to Figure 1). The Consensus forecast is the one-year ahead CPI inflation from
Consensus Economics. Long-run inflation expectations (yield curve) are evaluated as the difference between long-term government of Canada bonds (10 years and longer,
CANSIM: v122544) and the yield on real return bonds (CANSIM: v122553).international coordination in the area of banking
regulation and supervision,7 while the growing
global interdependence of trading in goods,
services, and labour, has also led to more serious
attempts by governments to cooperate in
designing compatible trade policies. Yet, while
international cooperation, if not coordination, in
all of these areas is rife, the spread of IT did not
take place as the outcome of a concerted global
strategy to control inflation.8 One cannot help
but note the stark contrast with the adoption of
the Bretton Woods system in the aftermath of
World War II, and the search for a monetary
anchor of some kind during the stagflation of the
1970s and 1980s, when crises forced a rethink of
the international monetary order. 
A few countries, including Canada, subsequently
adopted a monetary target, but ex post this proved to
be a brief interlude on the road to the current IT
monetary policy strategy.9 Other countries, most
notably in Europe, were still clinging to a form of
exchange rate pegging to carry them through to
eventual monetary union and the creation of a
single currency, the euro. 
Throughout this period, as is now well known,
macroeconomic conditions were dismal with high
inflation and poor economic growth the norm in
much of the world. The fear of a return to higher
inflation, combined with a slowing economy,
remains a possibility. At the very least, a milder
version of the 1970s style stagflation may well be
in the offing.10 Even if worries over inflation are
now being replaced with fears of the onset of
deflation,11 due to sharply lower commodity
prices and a global recession, one should be
reminded of the link between the ongoing credit
crunch and the resulting supply-side effects. This
scenario is also one that can lead to higher, not
lower, inflation (Blinder 1987).
The Spread of Inflation Targeting Around
the World
As others have noted (e.g., Rose 2007), IT has
spread around the world, especially among
emerging market economies. Appendix A also
provides summary information about some of the
key ingredients of IT regimes in a global context.
Clearly, there is some diversity in what is targeted,
how this is accomplished, and over what horizon
the chosen objective is to be attained. It is notable,
however, that differences in the range of desirable
inflation rates across the globe have diminished
considerably since IT was introduced in the
industrial world. There is, likewise, little variation
in how monetary policy decisions are reached.
Instead, there is considerably more diversity in the
degree of accountability and disclosure of the
monetary policy process (e.g., see Siklos 2002,
Chapter 6; Eijffinger and Geraats 2006; Dincer
and Eichengreen 2007.) Examination of Dincer
and Eichengreen’s (2007) index of transparency
(not shown) reveals that four of eight IT countries
in the industrial world are considerably more
transparent than industrial countries that do not
explicitly target inflation. Indeed, only the USA
and the euro area come close to being as
transparent as those economies with quantified
objectives. In contrast, transparency among
emerging market economies’ central banks is
considerably lower than at counterpart central
banks in the industrial world. 
C.D. Howe Institute
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7 Yet another manifestation of these developments is the creation of the Financial Stability Forum.
8 Indeed, as Rose (2007, p. 687) put it: “The system of domestically oriented monetary policy and floating exchange rates and capital mobility was not
formally planned. It does not have a central role for the United States, gold, or the International Monetary Fund. In short, it is the diametric opposite
of the postwar system; Bretton Woods, reversed.”
9 The failure of monetary targeting is chronicled in Bernanke and Mishkin (1992), and is perhaps best remembered for the phrase uttered by former
Bank of Canada Governor, Gerald Bouey, when he said: ‘we didn’t abandon monetary aggregates, they abandoned us.’ 
10 This fear is perhaps best exemplified by Meltzer (2008).
11 There are both ‘good’, ‘bad’, and ‘ugly’ forms of deflation. The current talk is about the latter kind. See Burdekin and Siklos (2004) and references
therein.Commentary 292 | 5
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There also exist differences in the manner in
which the targets are implemented, understood,
and how credible they are, features of the IT
strategy that continue to be downplayed. Only
some of the salient ones are mentioned here.12
Perhaps the least appreciated feature of such
regimes, at least from a global perspective, is the
distinction between inflation reduction and
inflation-control targets. All industrial countries
have operated under unchanging inflation
objectives for several years. In contrast, in only
roughly half of emerging market economies with
quantitative inflation objectives have the target
ranges remained fixed for two years or more (also
see Siklos 2008a). Some central banks are required
to keep inflation within a target range, others
must meet a single numerical objective. Still
others view the target as a medium-term objective
to be met over some ill-defined cycle with
minimal, if any, requirements to justify breaches
in the inflation objective. 
Most central banks target a headline rate of
inflation, as measured by consumer prices,
although several central banks set their sights on
core inflation, or a version of core inflation that
excludes certain especially volatile items in a
broader price index. One powerful theoretical
argument favouring reliance on core inflation is
that a credible central bank can then ignore drifts
in the price level that are unlikely to be
permanently reflected in headline inflation.
However, other than the measurement issues
involved, and the complex task of distinguishing
transitory from permanent shocks affecting
inflation, this solution does not deal with the fact
that the public is not only more likely to follow
movements in headline inflation but ultimately
cares primarily about this measure of loss in
purchasing power. After all, wages and the real
return of financial assets are evaluated on the basis
of headline inflation. 
Focussing on core rather than headline inflation
can be problematic for another reason: the relative
importance of volatile elements in headline CPI
measures vary considerably around the world.
Whereas central banks in the industrial world may
arguably be in a better position to explain the
relevance of core indicators of inflationary
pressures since, for example, food and energy
prices represent a somewhat smaller proportion of
the overall index, the same is not true for
emerging markets economies that are attempting
to emulate an IT strategy. 
The formality of the IT regime can also vary
widely. In some countries, there is legislation that
outlines the obligations of both parties to the
agreement to target inflation (e.g., as in New
Zealand), in others there exists an understanding,
not legislated, between the Governor of the
central bank and the Minister of Finance about
what range of inflation rates is desirable (e.g., as 
in Australia and Canada). However, observers
should not harbour the illusion that politics has
anywhere been removed from deciding the remit
of a central bank. Ultimately, any monetary policy
is dictated by the wishes of a particular
government and legislature. 
In a few instances, the central bank decides the
appropriate inflation objective that is expected to
be met over time (e.g., the European Central
Bank). While IT may well have created a ‘virtuous
feedback loop,’ with lower and more stable
inflation underwritten by the political authorities,
this attitude is less well entrenched in non-
industrial economies with explicit inflation-
control objectives. Several countries, including IT
countries in the industrial world, have adopted
fiscal rules to constrain the ease with which a
deficit, especially of the politically motivated
variety, can re-emerge. Nevertheless, it is unclear
how binding existing fiscal commitments are,
especially as the world economy endures a period
of economic stress. For example, Europe’s Stability
and Growth Pact (SGP) has already been watered
down, or is not taken sufficiently seriously (e.g.,
see Annett, Decressin, and Deppler 2005, and
references therein). 
In addition, there exist differences in the degree
to which central banks are committed to a floating
exchange rate, thought by some to be the sine qua
12 See, for example, Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen (1999), Rose (2007), and Siklos (2002, 2008a).| 6 Commentary 292
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non of a coherent IT strategy. In times of
economic stress, these differences may well matter,
especially as in the current international economic
environment policymakers have begun to call for
more ‘flexibility’ in their regimes without, of
course, spelling out what this means nor what this
implies for the existing exchange rate regime.13
Has Inflation Targeting Worked?
Still, at the heart of all IT regimes is the core belief
that low and stable inflation rates represent a goal
that society ought to aspire to. The fact that
policymakers and, ultimately, the public can be
convinced of the desirability of such a goal stems
in no small measure from the emergence of a
consensus about the appropriate social utility
function that ought to govern a central bank’s
actions.14 Simply stated, it was deemed optimal to
conduct policy in such a manner as to minimize
the variance of inflation and real GDP growth.
Eventually, the trade-off between the two, and the
policies required to minimize them, became
enshrined in what academics and policymakers
have come to accept as constituting ‘best practice’
in the conduct of monetary policy.
The policy has survived the onslaught of
repeated banking, financial, and economic crises
around the world, and has thrived in spite of, or
perhaps because of, the seemingly relentless forces
of globalization. Even so, whereas academic
research has clearly demonstrated that IT has
served us well, there is as yet no conclusive
evidence that an explicit IT policy yields superior
economic outcomes relative to a monetary policy
regime that just ‘does it’ when it comes to
controlling inflation. 
The IMF (see IMF 2006) recently sought to
place the IT strategy in the most favourable light
possible. Yet, a cursory survey of the results of
both their study and those of others employing a
similar approach (e.g., Hyvonen 2004) suggests
that the evidence in favour of IT is inconclusive,
mainly, because the metric used to demonstrate
the supposed superiority over alternative regimes
is flawed, and is likely incapable of providing a
definitive answer about the ability of an IT regime
to deliver comparatively better inflation
performance.15
The Secret to Inflation Targeting’s
Success
I demonstrate below that the likely source of IT’s
success is that this strategy is better able to anchor
inflationary expectations, and delivers the
appropriate stance of monetary policy in a more
consistent manner.
Consider Figure 3A. I calibrate the eponymous
Taylor rule (explained in Appendix B) for a group of
five inflation-targeting and five non-IT economies
since the early 1990s.16They are: Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom
(IT); and the euro area, the United States, Malaysia,
13 As when the G24 Ministers, in April 2008, suggested that “…emerging markets and developing countries will need flexibility with regard to
fiscal and monetary policies to soften the impact of exogenous shocks on their economies.” (Intergovernmental Group of 24 2008). In 2007,
New Zealand, after abstaining from foreign exchange market intervention for about 15 years, intervened twice. In 2008, the Bank of Korea
intervened in order to attempt to use an appreciating currency to offset inflationary pressures. If the past gives any indications, these measures
are likely to fail. 
14 Taylor (2007) traces this development to the 1970s, when economic research had reached the point where: “…it was hard to find a paper in
which the policy objective was not stated.”
15 The usual approach is to estimate a regression wherein an inflation differential consisting of inflation in the targeting period less inflation
during a sample when targets were not in place is regressed on, among other variables, a dummy that identifies the adoption of IT (e.g., see 
Ball and Sheridan 2003). Ordinarily estimated in a cross-sectional framework, the test requires that inflation and non-IT regimes be identified.
The latter group serves as a control group. In IMF (2006) the control group consists of 29 countries while the IT group consists of only 
13 countries (all emerging market countries). Although there is an attempt to check for robustness there is virtually no justification offered 
for the selection of the control group of countries which is a veritable motley crew of countries with different monetary policy strategies 
(see IMF 2006, Appendix II), including some countries that would soon go on to adopt an inflation target (e.g., Turkey).
16 The notes to Figures 3 and 4 provide details of the estimation of policy rates consistent with a Taylor rule for IT and non-IT economies.Singapore, and Switzerland (non-IT). The non-IT
group comprise economies that have deliberately
eschewed the IT label, have explicitly adopted
exchange-rate regimes of the non-floating variety,
and include some small open economies that have
delivered relatively low and stable inflation rates
during the period considered. 
Next, I consider how monetary policy is actually
conducted in the two groups of economies
considered here, again relative to the Taylor rule
prescription shown in Figure 3A.17The results are
shown in Figure 3B. It is clearly seen that actual
policy rates in IT economies are set higher than the
“standard” Taylor rule would require until about
2000 in both groups considered, but especially
among the ITers. Thereafter, policy is consistently
loose in the non-IT economies and, at least on
average, just about right in the IT camp. Figure 3B,
therefore, is another demonstration that differences
exist in the actual conduct of monetary policy
between IT and non-IT countries that may not be
so evident if we only consider ex post inflation
performance of the economies in question.
If we are prepared to assume that the non-IT
group de facto behaves as if it targets inflation in the
1-3 percent range, Figure 4 reveals that breaches in
the inflation target are significantly smaller among
the IT group of countries.18 In addition, the
persistence in policy rate movements is generally
higher in IT economies than in the non-IT
economies considered, though the gap between the
two groups vanishes after 2002 (results not shown).
In other words, IT delivers a credibility bonus and
greater predictability in nominal interest rate
movements.19 Siklos (2008a) provides further
evidence on the international experience with IT.20
First, when an inflation target is threatened, it is
not necessarily the upper range of the target that is
breached. Second, when breaches do occur, they are
transitory. Rarely do breaches go on beyond two
consecutive quarters. It should be noted, however,
that since inflation target ranges tend to be more
malleable outside the industrial world, the evidence
on breaches in emerging market economies is likely
biased by giving the impression that they are more
successful than they really are. Third, breaches tend
to be less variable in both the industrial and
emerging market economies than in non-IT
economies. Nevertheless, the record of the US, the
euro area and Switzerland is comparable to that of
any IT economy.
The inflation scare of early 2008 was nothing
new. As recently as 2004, policymakers also worried
about rising prices. Figure 5 plots one-year-ahead
inflation expectations, generally based on
professional forecasts, against changes in the policy
rates in eight IT and four non-IT central banks
since 2004. There are some notable features in the
Figure. First, interest rate policies even among IT
central banks are quite diverse. Not only is the
timing of interest rate changes different across these
central banks but the size and even the sign of
changes can be quite different. To the extent that
there exists a common element in the business-cycle
features these industrial economies are facing (see
below), this puts paid the notion that all IT central
banks think or act alike. For example, during the
2004 inflation scare four of eight IT central banks
raised their policy rates. Similarly, half of the non-IT
central banks did the same. In the latest inflation
scare (2008) five of eight IT central banks raised
interest rates while only one of the four other central
banks followed suit. Note also that whereas short-
term inflationary expectations rose sharply in all
non-IT economies, the same signs are apparent so
far in only five of eight IT countries shown. 
Commentary 292 | 7
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17 A thorny issue, the subject of considerable debate, concerns the measurement of the equilibrium natural rate of interest. A 2 percent
assumption for the natural rate incorporated into Taylor’s original rule, is likely the most sensible one to work with and, unless there are strong
a priori reasons to believe that the natural real interest rate is inherently higher in IT economies than elsewhere, the conclusions drawn below
will be correct. 
18 The mean size of breaches is 0.15 percent in non-IT economies, and 0.06 percent in IT economies. The figures are quarterly at annual rates.
The difference is statistically significant (t-statistic = 2.95, significance level =.004). 
19 Whether this result reflects the credibility of the IT regime (i.e., policymaking) as opposed to the credibility of monetary policy more generally,
is unclear (see Drazen and Masson 1994, who made the distinction).
20 The online technical appendix to this paper contains an updated version of Siklos (2008, Table 1).| 8 Commentary 292
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Figure 3B: Monetary Policy Stance in Inflation and Non-Inflation targeting EconomiesCommentary 292 | 9
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Figure 4: The Anchoring of Inflationary Expectations in Inflation and Non-inflation Targeting Economies
Notes to Figures 3 and 4: Cross-sectional averages of policy rates for inflation and non-inflation targeting economies were applied to a Taylor rule of the form 
it = 3.5t + 1.5 t + 0.5yt, where it is the (nominal) policy rate, t is the inflation gap (i.e., actual less targeted inflation, yt is the output gap (see Poole (2006) for a discussion of the
choice of numerical values). Inflation targeting economies are: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, and the UK. Non-inflation targeting economies are: the euro area, the
US, Malaysia, Singapore, and Switzerland. Policy rates can be obtained from the web sites of individual country central banks accessible via the Bank of International Settlements’
central bank hub (http://www.bis.org). Output gaps were constructed by applying a Hodrick-Prescott filter (smoothing parameter = 1600) to the logarithm of real GDP and
evaluating the percent difference relative to the actual (log of) real GDP, with the exception of Canada where its March 2008 estimate of the output gap was used (available from
www.bankofcanada.ca/en/rates/index.html#indicators). For the inflation targets, the mid-point of target ranges over time was used. Details can be found in Siklos (2008a). For
the non-inflation targeting economies, a 2 percent target was assumed throughout. In Figure 3, breaches were obtained by relying on the one year ahead Consensus forecast of
inflation less the top or bottom of the inflation target range. For non-inflation targeting economies, a 1-3 percent target range is assumed. 
~ ~
Clearly, over time important differences in
monetary policies emerge that may not be
reflected in analyses that focus on inflation
performance alone. Tests (not shown, but see the
technical Appendix) reveal that business cycles are
less synchronous between the non-IT economies
and the US than between IT countries and the
US, but only after 2003. If ‘decoupling,’ or,
preferably, growing divergences in business cycles
between these two sets of countries has emerged,
it is a rather recent phenomenon. Unfortunately,
these tests are not informative about the role of
the IT regime per se in generating this outcome,
but the results may help explain the different
monetary policy stances reported above,
particularly since 2004 (also see Figure 5). 
Plus ça Change?
When the Bank of Canada released background
information in November 2006 about the renewal
of the inflation target (Bank of Canada 2006)
what was omitted from the announcement is
more interesting than what was listed as being on
the agenda for future research.
Revisiting the Bank of Canada’s Remit
To begin with, and conceivably most importantly,
improvements in inflation performance are a
worldwide phenomenon. The left-hand-side panel
of Figure 6 reveals that, since 1998, inflation
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policy rate Economist Consensus policy rate Economist Consensus
policy rate Economist Consensus policy rate Consensus
United States
Figure 5: Changes in Policy Rates and Inflation Expectations in Inflation and Select Non-Inflation Targeting Economies
Note: Policy rates are as defined in the technical Appendix, and in Appendix A. All data were obtained from individual central banks. Inflation Expectations are from the sources listed
in each Figure above and represent the forecast in the calendar year following the observation shown with the sources provided in each Figure. The only exception is the Survey of
Professional Forecasters for the euro area which is the 2 year ahead forecast. Hence, it is plotted on the left hand scale while various proxies for are shown on the right
hand scale, where t is the current calendar year. Commentary 292 | 11
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Figure 6: Inflation in Various Regions and Countries Around the World: 1998-2007
Notes: Inflation is the year over year percent change in the CPI or each respective economy. Data are from the February 2008 CD-ROM of the International Monetary Fund’s
International Financial Statistics. Highlighted is a band of 1-3percent, the current inflation target band in Canada. 21 Mean deviations from the rule were -0.52 percent for Canada (statistically different from zero), and -0.06 percent. for the US (not significantly
different from zero).
22 This attitude is reflected in the views of Alan Greenspan who is sceptical of a central bank’s ability to pre-empt an asset price bubble but never
does entirely rule out an activist policy in this regard. “But how do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values,
which then become subject to unexpected and prolonged contractions, as they have in Japan over the past decade? And how do we factor that
assessment into monetary policy? We as central bankers need not be concerned if a collapsing financial asset bubble does not threaten to impair
the real economy, …But we should not underestimate, or become complacent about, the complexity of the interactions of asset markets and
the economy.” (Greenspan 2007, p. 177) The Fed, under Bernanke, may well have reconsidered Greenspan’s stance (Lahart 2008).
23 See, inter alia, Borio and Lowe (2002), Bean (2003), Detken and Smets (2004), and Siklos and Bohl (2008). For an excellent overview of the
case for more activist policy in the face of large asset price movements, see Roubini (2006).
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of inflation-control objectives agreed to between
the Bank of Canada and the federal government.
Nevertheless, the right-hand-side panel of the
same Figure reveals some rather disquieting signs
on the inflation front after 2006. Inflation outside
Canada rose everywhere. 
While the Bank could not have known in 2006
that a surge in global inflation would capture the
headlines in 2008, it could have asked more
explicitly in its remit how an IT strategy might
deal with a ‘worst case’ scenario when this kind of
policy strategy is put to a severe test.
Canadian versus US Monetary Policies
Closely related, the situation as it stood in 2006
emerged as a result of, or was prompted by, a benign
worldwide macroeconomic environment, often
referred to as the Great Moderation. The reduction
in the volatility of inflation and output growth was
nothing short of remarkable. Blanchard and Simon
(2001) were among the first to bring attention to
this phenomenon but their evidence only
documents the facts up to the 1990s. 
The foregoing developments allowed monetary
policy to become expansionary (see below). Figure 7
is an attempt to explain, again relying on the Taylor
rule, the evolution of the overnight rate in Canada
and in the US since IT began. Depending on how
one ‘calibrates’ the policy rule, monetary policy has,
for the most part, been consistent with conditions of
monetary ease since 2000 in both countries.21
Indeed, other than in 1994, and again briefly in
2006, the stance of policy has been similar in both
countries. The brief tightening in the US that began
in 2006, but was quickly reversed in 2007 with the
onset of the sub-prime crisis, explains the divergence
in policies towards the end of the sample. On
average, monetary policy has been persistently
expansionary since inflation targets were introduced
in Canada. This result holds even under a variety of
assumptions about the evolution of potential
output. The combination of a favourable external
inflationary environment, together with modest
threats to the underlying inflation-control target,
suggests that, over the lifetime of the present regime,
it may not have been sufficiently stress-tested.
Monetary Policy and Financial Stability
The current bout of financial uncertainty threatens
the delicate balance between the Bank of Canada’s
mandate to “…mitigate by its influence fluctuations
in the general level of production, trade, prices, and
employment…” (Bank of Canada Act (1985),
Preamble, c. B-2), and the power vested in the
Governor if he is “…of the opinion that there is a
severe and unusual stress on the financial market or
financial system…” (Bank of Canada Act (1985),
section 18, g.1). Although we may not yet know the
full extent of the fallout from what began as the sub-
prime crisis during the summer of 2007, at least
Canada does not appear to share the same prospects
as the US with regard to a collapsing housing price
bubble, certainly in terms of magnitude.
However, as the US Federal Reserve and other
major central banks, including the Bank of
Canada, continue to struggle with the credit
crunch, the asymmetry between the now widely
accepted notion that anticipated rises in inflation
should be pre-empted, while asset price bubbles
should be dealt with retroactively, is glaring.22
This, in spite of the fact that there exists
considerable evidence linking rapidly rising
housing and equity prices to subsequent strains in
the conduct of monetary policy.23C.D. Howe Institute
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Figure 7: Monetary Policy Rules in Canada and a US-Canada Comparison
Notes: Also see notes to Figures 3 and 4 for definitions and the Taylor rule specification. The Canadian Taylor rule uses the CPI and the March 2008 estimates of the output gap.
The US Taylor rule uses the PCE deflator and the Congressional Budget Office’s output gap estimates and the weights as used by Poole (2006).Indeed, the failure to pre-empt the asset price
bubble associated with the high-tech sector in
1999, and current attempts to deal with the
collapse of the US real estate market after the fact,
have led to accusations that the manner in which
central banks react to asset price movements
results in overly loose monetary policy that will
eventually generate high inflation. Whether
rolling bubbles stem from monetary policy
relaxing its emphasis on price stability remains in
question. Indeed, the discussion has highlighted
what used to be referred to as the limits of
monetary policy, a term that is no longer
frequently heard from the lips of central bankers.
Policymakers are asking, once again, what role a
central bank has in supervising and regulating
banks and other types of financial institutions, a
topic that is beyond the scope of this Commentary. 
Blinder (2008) points out that no central bank
has a set of instruments that can target a stock
market bubble that, as in the case of the tech
bubble of 2000, tends to be centered in a segment
of the stock market. Bubbles that stem from
irresponsible bank lending practices, however, are
another matter because the central bank and bank
supervisors, if they are separate institutions, do
have the information and the ability to step in
before the damage is done. Blinder is correct but
only up to a point. More importantly, his
arguments do not diminish the case for more
activism by central banks in the face of run-ups in
asset prices. Even if stock market bubbles are
confined to a particular segment of the market,
their impact spills over to other prices and other
markets elsewhere. Moreover, if the existing
empirical evidence suggests that equity price
bubbles are economically less harmful than
housing price bubbles, this does not absolve the
central bank from communicating its concerns
over the direction of change in selected asset prices.
Using an interest rate instrument to temper stock
price increases can still be the appropriate response. 
The Bank of Canada, therefore, could be more
explicit in stating how it might pre-empt the
consequences of stresses in the economy and the
financial system in particular and avoid the
accusation levelled at some central banks that they
are effective enablers of asset price bubbles. While
this is certainly not easy, the attempt ought to be
worthwhile. Filardo (2008), for example,
highlights the benefits of a more activist central
bank in relation to large asset price movements.
Borio and Shim (2007) also make the case that
central banks can be effective in mitigating asset
price movements. 
Defining Price Stability
It is worth noting that the answer to the question
“what is meant by the term price stability?” has
been postponed since at least 1990. Former
Governor John Crow attached a great deal of
importance to this issue. The official
announcement of what was then referred to as
inflation reduction targets explicitly pointed out
that Bank of Canada research “…suggests a rate of
increase in consumer prices that is clearly below 
2 per cent. However, a more precise definition is
not specified now – in the event that further
evidence and analysis relevant to this matter
become available in the next few years.” (Crow
2002, p. 178) Almost two decades later, we still
wait for a precise definition. The 2006 Bank of
Canada background paper announcing the
renewal of IT until 2011 no longer refers to a
desire to define price stability the next time
around the targets are slated for renewal. One
possibility is that the current target of 2 percent
essentially amounts to a consensus view about
what price stability represents. However, a formal
statement from the Bank indicating that 2 percent
headline inflation is tantamount to price stability
has never been forthcoming.24 Instead, the Bank
prefers to frame the question as asking “…whether
the specific regime established in the 1990s will
deliver the greatest contribution that monetary
policy can make to economic performance and to
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
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24 The Bank defines price stability in the following terms: “A situation where inflation is low enough so that it no longer affects people’s economic
decisions is referred to as price stability.” From http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/backgrounders/bg-i1.html.the well-being of Canadians in the decades
ahead.” (Bank of Canada 2006, p. 3).25
Interestingly, the European Central Bank appears
to have settled this issue. The definition of price
stability it has set for itself is “…as a year-on-year
increase in the Harmonized Index of Consumer
Prices for the euro area of below 2 percent.”26
We’ve Seen this Movie Before
Rose (2007) is one of many authors celebrating
the successes of IT. In Siklos (2002), I pointed out
that IT was about to surpass the Bretton Woods
system in terms of longevity. Rose’s work adds
formal empirical evidence as well as confirming
the longevity of the IT regime. Nevertheless, there
are signs that this policy is already being put to a
more severe test. This has led to some prominent
economists, including Joseph Stiglitz (2008), to
argue that: “Today, inflation targeting is being put
to the test and it will almost certainly fail.”
Friedman (2004, p. 130) is even more emphatic
about the drawbacks of IT regimes, referring to
the policy as “…a framework not for commu-
nicating the central bank’s goals but for obscuring
them….” He is especially critical of IT central
banks’ unwillingness to be explicit about output
performance under various inflation projections,
and about not being sufficiently open concerning
the weight attached on the output gap in the
conduct of policy. The first criticism is well taken
though Friedman’s opinion applies to fewer and
fewer IT central banks. The second criticism 
also contains an element of truth but Friedman
never explains what is gained from knowing the
weight of the output gap in advance of setting the
policy instrument.27 More importantly, we are
never told whether alternative monetary policy
strategies can deliver better policy or economic
outcomes than IT. 
Threats to the Inflation-Targeting
Strategy: Complacency and Political
Pressure
The financial crisis that has unfolded since the
summer of 2007 risks sidetracking central banks
away from their principal mission for a number of
different reasons.28 First, while it is true, as Rose
asserts, that no country has been forced to abandon
IT, there are obvious signs of serious difficulties with
the targeting regime in various parts of the world. 
In the UK where IT was introduced soon after
the policy was enacted in New Zealand and in
Canada, the Governor, in 2008, was required for
the first time since IT was introduced to explain,
in a letter to the Chancellor, why the inflation
target was breached and to provide an explanation
and the timing of the steps that would be
necessary to return inflation back to target. 
In Thailand the breaching of the target in 2008,
and the central bank’s attempts to even modestly
raise interest rates to counter inflationary pressures,
led to political pressure on the Bank of Thailand
(e.g., see Minder 2008). Consider also the example
of Iceland where the targets were introduced in
2001. The tolerance range was considerably wider
until 2003 when the current range of +1 ½ percent
was fixed. In spite of the generous margins for
error, the upper range of the target was breached
C.D. Howe Institute
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25 Although some (Kamenik et al. 2008) contend that the Bank of Canada has, in effect, been operating as if it followed a price level target, albeit
with a 2 percent annual drift, how the Bank of Canada has convinced the public to hold expected inflation at that level is not spelled out.
Moreover, if 2 percent is indeed akin to price stability this opinion would have to be publicly announced and supported by the government
which ought to have final say on such a definition.
26 The Maastricht Treaty mandates the ECB to achieve price stability. See www.ecb.int/mopo/strategy/pricestab/html/inde.en.html. Note that the
ECB, since its creation, has yet to meet its own objective in a consistent fashion. Hetzel (2008, Chapter 15) describes how the FOMC, and
Greenspan in particular, concluded, around 1996, that 2 percent was an inflation target for the US consistent with price stability.
27 Lars Svensson, currently Deputy-Governor of the Swedish Riksbank, has argued that central banks ought to reveal the parameter values in their
loss function. So far, no central bank has followed this strategy.
28 Saunders (2008), who reviews the forces at play in the early stages of global efforts aimed at preventing a recurrence of the recent financial
crisis, writes: “The idea that central banks can quietly stick to keeping inflation at bay is gone.” Fortunately, some central bankers, such as 
Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB, beg to differ: “The primary goal of a central banker and certainly of the ECB is to maintain price
stability…, which is a necessary condition for financial stability, if not a sufficient condition.” (Trichet 2008).almost half the time since the inflation objectives
were put in place (12 of 28 quarters). One culprit:
the phenomenal growth in the foreign debt to
GDP ratio, which led to the collapse of the
currency. This raises a question that has lately often
been left out of the IT debate, namely the extent to
which fiscal or debt considerations can jeopardize
an inflation objective. 
Saunders (2008), who reviews the forces at play in
the early stages of global efforts aimed at preventing
a recurrence of the recent financial crisis, writes:
“The idea that central banks can quietly stick to
keeping inflation at bay is gone.” Fortunately, some
central bankers, such as Jean-Claude Trichet,
President of the ECB, beg to differ: “The primary
goal of a central banker and certainly of the ECB is
to maintain price stability…, which is a necessary
condition for financial stability, if not a sufficient
condition.” (Trichet 2008).
Will Inflation Targeting Continue to
Spread?
In spite of the current Fed Chairman’s sympathy
towards IT, the US is no closer to adopting this
type of monetary policy strategy than when Alan
Greenspan stood steadfastly against adopting
formal inflation targets. Similarly, there are no
signs that the European Central Bank will anytime
soon admit to conducting policy as if it were
explicitly targeting inflation. 
Moreover, as Rose’s own work also make clear
(also, see IMF 2006), the rising popularity of IT
largely comes from its spread into emerging
market economies. Not only is their historical
commitment to low and stable inflation more
suspect but the success of IT is frequently tinged
by the not-so-infrequent resort to moving the
targets. Hence, the durability of these regimes is
very much open to debate.29
Only a relatively small number of countries
have stable inflation-target ranges of the kind the
Bank of Canada has had to abide by since 1995.
Therefore, there are plenty of reasons not to be
too self-congratulatory about the wonders of an
IT regime.30 Rather than IT per se, a more
important consideration is commitment to a price
stability objective. In so far as an explicit inflation
target facilitates the communication of how
monetary policy is actually implemented, and the
variables under which a monetary policy is
conditioned, this type of regime ought to be
preferred over ones that effectively amount to
simply declaring a quantitative target only.
All Together Now?
Finally, while the floating exchange rate regime
and central bank independence rule the day, a
change in this policy environment is not out of
the question. Indeed, several IT central banks
reserve the right and continue to engage regularly
in foreign exchange market intervention (see
Appendix A). So-called trends in one direction can
easily be reversed and there are plenty of historical
precedents to draw upon that justify this position,
as illustrated previously.
It was pointed out earlier that IT has enjoyed
widespread appeal because of a growing consensus
that price stability is a desirable objective, and that
an explicit numerical inflation objective may well
be a critical ingredient in credibly achieving this
result. As such, policymakers around the world
have independently arrived at what Taylor (2007a)
refers to as a ‘global cooperation policy.’ This
refers to the recognition, reached more or less
independently by countries in several parts of the
world, that ‘best practice’ in monetary policy
involves responding to inflation and output
shocks following a Taylor rule, in its classic form. 
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29 As this is written, inflation in South Africa has been outside the generous 3-6 percent target band for about a year with no signs of an
immediate let up in inflation that recently reached double digits (http://www.reservebank.co.za/; go to Media releases & statements). 
Similarly, a relative newcomer to IT, Turkey, has so far yet to achieve its inflation target necessitating explanatory statements from the Governor
(e.g., see the Governor’s April 30, 2008 statement available at http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/eni/eng/) and a revision to its inflation-control path. 
30 Hopefully, the publication of Rose’s findings is not the manifestation of Goodhart’s law (“Any observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse
once pressure is placed on it for control purposes,” Goodhart (1984, p.96). In the present context, this would seem to imply the pending
unraveling of IT as a monetary policy strategy.| 18 Commentary 292
Indeed, empirical evidence is available to
support the contention that, so long as different
countries adopt a comparable monetary policy
strategy, summarized by adherence to a Taylor
rule, there is no particular advantage in terms of
policy outcomes in separately reacting to the
exchange rate.31 The reason is straightforward. 
A central bank that nominally cares only about
inflation and the output gap but, in practice, takes
into account the conduct of monetary policy in
the rest of the world, effectively acts as if it also
responds to the exchange rate.
Taylor suggests that directly responding to
exchange rate developments may be one of the by-
products of globalization, in so far as the latter
presents a temptation to veer off course from
following a policy rule that focuses on responding
only to inflation and output gaps. This approach
effectively leads to a deterioration of a framework
that, in his opinion, has worked well for almost two
decades. Interestingly, he does not invoke the role of
formal IT, as practiced in countries such as Canada,
except to point out that, in emerging markets where
this strategy has been employed, there has been a
tendency to react to exchange rate movements.32
Apparently, this can be destabilizing.
It is important, however, to draw a distinction,
not raised in Taylor (2007a), between a central
bank that explicitly pays attention to the nominal
exchange rate as a complementary objective of
monetary policy versus a monetary policy that
recognizes that exchange rate movements may not
reflect ‘fundamentals’ at every moment in time
and, therefore, appears as if to react to the
monetary policy of the centre (i.e., the US or the
euro area). 
Alternatively, interest rate smoothing, a widely
recognized stylized fact of interest rate movements
can also give the appearance of a policy reaction
function that seemingly reacts to exchange rate
movements. But this need not be destabilizing.
Such practices are potentially destabilizing only
when an explicit and direct role is given to the
exchange rate in the setting of the policy rate.33
What Role for Monetary Policy
Coordination?
Table 1 shows regression evidence suggesting that
exchange rate considerations do matter in a wide
variety of countries, whether they explicitly target
inflation or not. That this feature of the data
indicates a threat to good conduct in monetary
policy is unclear for reasons just outlined. Of
course, the foregoing deals with the first moment in
exchange rate movements (i.e., the mean). There is
still the open question concerning whether second
moments (i.e., volatility) can indeed have a
deleterious impact on economic performance.
Nevertheless, as pointed out by Mishkin and
Savastano (2000), there ought to be no confusion
about exchange rate considerations, so long as the
primacy of the inflation objective is upheld.
Taylor’s conclusions about the benefits of
following a monetary policy strategy based on no
more than on a common understanding of how to
set the domestic policy instrument may, however,
be overly optimistic for other reasons as well.
Coenen et. al. (2008) demonstrate that the net
benefits of a go-it-alone approach, wherein the
central bank is oblivious to the policy rule of other
countries, is highly sensitive to the degree of
C.D. Howe Institute
31 Collins and Siklos (2004) estimate optimal rules derived from the standard quadratic loss function of the central banker and find that even in
very open economies such as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, explicit concern for the exchange rate does not improve policy outcomes.
Paralleling this result is the conclusion reached by Clarida (2001) that the classic Taylor rule works just as well for a small open economy as it
does for large economies such as the US. 
32 Nor does he point out that some exchange rate movements stem from changes in demand, as reflected, say, in rising commodity prices which
then translate into an appreciation. Alternatively, exchange rate movements can reflect portfolio shifts such as when markets favour assets
denominated in a particular currency (e.g., the U.S. dollar). The Bank of Canada has referred to this distinction as type One and type Two
exchange rate movements. See Dodge (2005).
33 The archetypical example perhaps of this phenomenon took place when the Reserve Bank of New Zealand promoted the Monetary Conditions
Index (Canada flirted with this strategy but without the same degree of commitment). See Siklos (2000).Commentary 292 | 19
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Country No. of Quarters Mean Deviation Coefficient on Fed funds rate
Industrial
Australia 51 2.04 (1.97)* 0.46 (.00
Canada 52 -0.48 (1.92) -0.05 (.44)
/0.18(.00)
Korea 31 2.41 (5.00)* 0.85 (.00)
New Zealand 52 1.53 (1.30)* 0.35 (.00)
Norway 52 0.36 (2.60) -0.09 (.29)
Sweden 52 1.96 (1.83)* 0.51 (.00)
United Kingdom 35 1.44 (1.40)* 0.41 (.00)
Iceland 20 3.78 (3.09)* 1.59 (.00)
Emerging
Brazil 27 11.04 (5.69)* 3.00 (.00)
Chile 24 2.00 (2.78)* 0.72 (.00)
Colombia 26 5.91 (5.94)* 0.72 (.00)
Mexico 28 3.75 (2.66)* 1.13 (.00)
Peru 16 0.51 (2.58) 0.23 (.47)
South Africa 24 4.93 (3.23)* 1.09 (.00)
Czech Republic 32 2.64 (3.16)* 0.63 (.00)
Hungary 20 3.15 (1.91)* 0.87 (.00)
Poland 29 11.32 (5.71)* 2.98 (.00)
Israel 52 6.51 (4.23)* 1.57 (.00)
Philippines 16 3.83 (3.29)* 1.35 (.02)
Thailand 23 -2.33 (2.26)* -0.54 (.00)
Indonesia 24 3.04 (4.95)* 0.88 (.01)
Non-Inflation Targeting 
US 52 -0.33 (1.71) -
Euro area 48 0.18 (1.02) 0.11 (.00)
Switzerland 24 -0.60 (0.68)* -0.12 (.02)
Japan 52 -0.12 (1.42) -0.05 (.32)
Argentina 47 3.65 (15.29)* 1.03 (.04)
Malaysia 47 -0.08 (1.43) -0.03 (.52)
Singapore 47 0.40 (2.41) 0.07 (.41)
Hong Kong 47 1.41 (6.94) 0.17 (.48)
Slovenia 47 -3.51 (3.08) -0.78 (.00)
Table 1: Monetary Policy in a Cross-Section of Countries and Policy Sensitivity to the Exchange Rate
Note: A Taylor rule (see Notes to Figures 2 and 3) was fitted to each country’s data, including the US. The difference between the two Taylor rule estimates are regressed on the
US Fed funds rate (no constant term). Also, see Taylor (2007).| 20 Commentary 292
openness of an economy and the degree to which
the economies eyeing each other are integrated.
There may well be advantages to conditioning
one’s monetary policy on the policy of another
country, especially if it is a large trading partner.
Furthermmore, the US dollar plays a dominant
role in international transactions and this feature
of the international economy may provide an
explanation for asymmetric pass-through effects.
Clearly, this issue is also relevant to the apparent
success of a made-in-Canada monetary policy
strategy. It is well known that while pass-through
effects were weak to non-existent when the
Canadian dollar was depreciating in the early years
of the new century, stronger pass-through effects
in the recent run-up of the currency may provide
clues as to why inflationary pressures in Canada
have, so far, been moderate. Exactly why these
forces appear to operate differently in some
countries, such as Australia, New Zealand, or even
the euro area, is never actually spelled out.
Therefore, despite Taylor’s (2007a) contention
that a commitment to low and stable inflation is
enough to mitigate pass-through effects, doubts
remain. It may well be sensible to appear to react
to the exchange rate even as the focus remains on
price stability.
Models that recognize the special role played 
by a dominant currency in international trade
(e.g., see Golderg and Tille 2008, and references
therein) imply that there are externalities resulting
from how monetary policy is carried out by a
dominant economy and that, under plausible
conditions, substantial gains in cooperation
between the center (i.e., the US) and the periphery
(e.g., a small open economy such as Canada’s) can
be exploited. Hence, the presence of a currency
with a significant international role should, in
theory, influence monetary policy strategy in
periphery countries. Nevertheless, the models used
to address these questions are in their infancy and,
so far, their ability to explain exchange rate
movements, is rather limited (e.g., see Jung 2007).
What all this means is that there is no cut-and-
dry answer to the dilemma concerning the role of
the exchange rate in a policy rule under IT.
Economies that are accused by Taylor of being on
the wrong path because they evince a concern for
the exchange rate are in regions of the world that,
at least according to some, have managed so far to
avoid the repercussions of the ongoing economic
trials and tribulations under way in the US.
Theory has not yet sufficiently progressed to
provide a clear answer about how much
international monetary policy coordination is
desirable. Perhaps cooperation, that is, the
exchange of information and experiences, is
enough. Equally important, as previously argued,
the details of an IT strategy vary considerably
around the world. The importance attached to
price stability in Canada, together with our
attachment to a freely floating exchange rate, sets
us apart from many IT economies, certainly
outside the industrial world but also vis-à-vis some
within the group of industrialized economies. It is
comforting that such policies appear to confer a
“good housekeeping seal of approval” as well as
finding some support in the data. 
Quo Vadis? 
Even if the present global financial turbulence
fades away, and central banks can return to
focusing primarily on the job of ensuring price
stability, its repercussions have already been felt in
Canada. Moreover, the return of a Democrat to
the White House may very well signal economic
policies that are less friendly to other countries.
The question is whether central banks, especially
in the industrial world, can withstand political
pressure.34 As Woolley (1984) pointed out some
time ago, Arthur Burns, a predecessor of
Greenspan at the US Federal Reserve, was one of
the world’s most respected economists but the
Great Inflation of the 1970s happened anyway.
Hence, central bankers cannot be entirely immune
C.D. Howe Institute
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to political pressure. However, unlike the 1970s
and early 1980s, their toolkit now includes more
autonomy, more effective monetary policy
instruments, and the fruits of more than a decade’s
worth of low and stable inflation. In spite of all
these advances, the age old habit of politicians
applying pressure on the central bank has not yet
been outlawed. Nor has the conundrum been
solved of what mix of interest rate changes and
moral suasion is most likely to deliver the best
monetary policy outcomes. An understanding of
the distinction between monetary policy actions
that are fundamentally credible from ones that are
not continues to elude policymakers. 
Large movements in the exchange rate, and the
reemergence of higher inflation, fuelled largely by
global considerations, will further put pressure on
policymakers to eye each other’s monetary policies
to a greater extent than has been the case for the
past decade. Since cooperation, if not
coordination, in trade, banking, and financial
policies, has been on the rise, at least until
recently, it comes as a bit of a surprise that there
have been fewer efforts to do the same in the
sphere of monetary policy. While Canada’s
monetary policy regime has systematically
delivered consistently low inflation in an era of
stable economic growth this era may very well
have come to an end. 
Accordingly, regardless of the fact that the
current targeting agreement expires in 2011, this
is a good time to reconsider the regime’s
configuration. Perhaps the principal lesson for the
Bank of Canada as it does this is to take careful
account of the international environment in
which it has been and will be operating. The
Bank’s failure to emphasize international matters
in 2006, when it set out its remit for reviewing 
the program was, in this author’s view, a serious
omission and it is to be hoped that they will, in
fact, play an important role in its deliberations. 
As this paper has argued, international
considerations are relevant for two reasons. First of
all, they provide a critical source of evidence on how
inflation targeting functions, for the simple reason
that Canada is only one of about 30 countries that
have such a regime in place in one form or another.
Furthermore, their configurations differ markedly
across specific programs, and experience with them
has also been widely varied. As we have seen, the
fact that no country that has adopted inflation
targeting has then abandoned the regime, save for
Finland and Spain which did so upon adopting the
Euro, has been widely read as a strong sign of the
basic idea’s strength. But as we have also seen, closer
inspection of the evidence suggests that it is
sometimes hard to identify specific benefits that
have accrued to countries with a formal inflation
targeting regime in place that were not also reaped
by other countries – provided that their monetary
authorities have displayed a credible commitment to
price stability more generally. 
Closely related, inflation targeting spread
internationally during a period in which the world
economy was experiencing a period of stability
often referred to as the Great Moderation. Perhaps
the spread of inflation targeting itself contributed
to this phenomenon, but decisive empirical
evidence to this effect has proved elusive, and in
any event, the collapse of this moderation into
financial crisis and severe recession in the last year
or two makes it hard to be complacent on this
front. The moral here is not that the unpre-
cedented stability that Canada enjoyed for 15 years
or so was unrelated to its inflation targeting regime
after all. But it does at the very least suggest that
we should be cautious about claiming too much
here, and hence in relying too heavily on a
renewed program to deliver such a happy
experience in the future. Other factors have been,
and are likely to remain important, and a further
careful study of international experience might
help reveal just what these are, what their
significance is, and what other aspects of Canadian
policy might do about them.
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute And if the success of inflation targeting in
Canada has depended on other aspects of the
domestic policy environment, this study has
argued that there are also good reasons to believe
that factors originating abroad can, do, and will
affect its performance. Domestic monetary policies
in economies linked by trade and capital markets
do interact with one another, and their local effects
are influenced by what is happening abroad.
Though, as we have seen, there are strong
arguments that suggest that inflation targeting
policies, each adopted for purely domestic reasons
and aimed at local goals in fact reinforce one
another across national boundaries and produce
desirable outcomes, we have also seen that there
are theoretical arguments to suggest that even
better results can be obtained by active policy 
co-operation or even outright co-ordination.
Though the pursuit of domestic inflation targets is
surely made simpler for policymakers if they ignore
their currency’s exchange rate with that of their
major trading partners, it is still perhaps possible
that its degree of success cannot be enhanced if the
extra complexities associated with incorporating
the exchange rate into policy decisions can be
mastered. The same goes for the behaviour of asset
prices more generally, a particularly pressing
consideration in the light of the recent worldwide
disruptions that have emanated from those
markets. And here too, given the high degree of
international integration of such markets, the best
response to such issues for one inflation targeting
country is unlikely to be independent of measures
taken elsewhere. Questions about international
cooperation, and perhaps outright policy 
co-ordination arise once more.
The point of all this, and indeed of this paper in
general, is not to offer particular answers to these
questions, but it is to argue that they must be
addressed and answered explicitly as part of the
process leading up to the renewal of Canada’s
monetary policy regime in 2011. Perhaps, then,
the debate up to now has been just a little too
parochial for comfort, and perhaps this essay will
help to broaden it in a constructive way. 
C.D. Howe Institute
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Central bankers of all stripes insist that low
and stable inflation is desirable. Therefore, at the
most general level, it is unclear what is so special
about central banks whose monetary policy
strategy carries the label inflation targeting.
First, and foremost, central banks in this
category are distinguished from others by virtue
of the fact that they publicly announce a
numerical objective for inflation. The Table
below shows which countries, in both the
industrial world and in emerging markets,
announced such targets in 2008.35
Most inflation-targeting central banks actually
target the mid-point of a range that is either a
zone of tolerance or comfort in view of the fact
that there are always shocks to prices that are
transitory in nature. Therefore, the degree to
which an individual inflation-targeting central
bank is happy to allow actual inflation to
fluctuate away from the mid-mid-point of any
range also varies. Second, by publicly announcing
such an objective, normally with the active
consent of government, these central banks are
expected to be relatively more accountable and
transparent than their counterparts; although this
is, strictly speaking, not always true as central
banks that endorse a variety of monetary policy
strategies not referred to as inflation targeting
have also become more transparent over the last
few years, as the Figure A1 below reveals. 
In any event, the fact that an inflation rate
over some future horizon is being targeted
means that the onus is on the central bank to be
forward looking, ordinarily by providing either
its own forecast or information about the
economy’s outlook. Beyond these essential
characteristics a closer look at how inflation
targeting is organized worldwide reveals a
surprising amount of diversity. 
For example, some central banks focus their
policy on the behaviour of a core measure of
inflation although the vast majority follows an
objective that is expressed in terms of a headline
measure of inflation. Most inflation targeting
central banks make decisions in a committee
setting but the precise manner these committees
are structured, their size, voting procedures, the
release information about their deliberations,
and how accountable they are for their decisions
can vary widely.36 Again, the Table below
provides some of the relevant information. For
example, at the Bank of England, individual
members of the Monetary Policy Committee are
accountable and the Chair (i.e., the Governor)
makes the motion which is then voted on. In
many central banks there is no government
representative on the committee while at other
central banks (e.g., Australia, Japan) there is a
representative present for the deliberations
(normally, non-voting). At still other central
banks (e.g., Canada) there is no committee
structure in Statutes and, while the Governor is
accountable for the monetary policy decision, a
committee exists to provide advice. Beyond the
committee structure there exists a wide variety
of arrangements that define the remit of the
central bank to deliver a specified inflation
objective. For example, the Bank of Canada’s
target is reviewed every five years, the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand negotiates a new remit
following each election. In the UK, the
Chancellor instructs the Bank of England to
meet a certain objective though there is, of
course, consultation with the Governor before
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
35 A separate appendix traces the evolution of such quantified objective around the world since inflation targeting was first introduced in 
New Zealand in 1990.
36 It is sometimes thought that the committee structure is the natural outcome of the desire for inflation targeting central banks to be both more
accountable to the public as well as demonstrating the need for careful deliberation and thought in rendering monetary policy decisions. While
there is some truth in this one must, however, remember, that the US Federal Reserve has long operated through the committee structure in
part for historical reasons (Meltzer 2002). Similar political considerations led to the creation of a committee structure for the European Central
Bank. Neither of these two major central banks target inflation.
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any announcement is made. In still other
countries the target is reviewed or renewed on a
more ad hoc basis.
Other differences between central banks
emerge when we consider the horizon over
which their policies are supposed to keep
inflation in check. Whereas there is a rough
consensus around the view that changes in the
stance of monetary policy take about two years
to work their way through an economy’s
transmission mechanism many central banks
rely on the ‘medium-term’ or ‘over the cycle’ as a
means of communicating their opinion about
over what period monetary policy will influence
inflation in the desired direction. Finally,
whereas it is now common for inflation
targeting central banks to rely on an interest rate
instrument there are some subtle differences
across countries about the precise mechanism
used to influence interest rates no doubt in part
because of differences in the maturity and
structure of financial markets. Nevertheless, of
greater interest is the degree to which inflation
targeting central banks foreswear any reliance on
intervention in foreign exchange markets. At the
risk of over-simplifying, inflation targeting
central banks in the industrial world are by far
the most reluctant to wield this instrument
while monetary authorities in emerging markets
tend more openly make clear that the buying
and selling of foreign exchange remains part of
the toolkit in the conduct of monetary policy.37
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37 Nevertheless, it proves difficult to ascertain whether the objective if any foreign exchange market intervention is to moderate fluctuations in the
exchange rate level, reduce uncertainty about foreign exchange rates, or as means to accomplish an inflation objective without having to change
the policy rate. These difficulties contribute to lessen the transparency of many central banks in emerging markets relative to ones in much of
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Country Start Target Range What is  Principal  Policy How Are
Date (2008) Targeted? Instrument(s)? Horizon? Decisions Made?
Industrial Economies
Australia 93.2 2-3 CPI Cash rate1 Over the cycle Committee
Canada 91.1 1-3 CPI Overnight rate1 Over 6 to 8 quarters Committee $
Iceland 01.1 1-4 CPI Repo rate None specified –  Governor
as close to target 
as possible
Korea 98.2 2.5-3.5 CPI Overnight call rate  3 years Committee
(+FOREX)
New Zealand 90.1 1.3 CPI* Cash rate1 Over the medium term Governor $
Norway 01.1 2.5 CPI Rate on bank deposits in  Over the medium term Committee
Norges Bank1
Sweden 93.1 1-3 CPI Repo rate None specified Committee
United Kingdom 92.4 1-3 CPI** Bank rate 2 years Committee
Emerging Markets
Brazil 99.2 2.5-6.5 CPI§ SELIC-overnight  Flexible – depending Committee
interbank loans on circumstances
Chile 90.3 2-4 CPI Monetary policy 2 years Committee 
interest rate (+FOREX)
Colombia 99.3 3.5-4.5 CPI Central bank  None specified Committee
intervention rate 
(+FOREX)
Mexico 99.1 2-4 CPI Overnight bank rate2 None specified Committee
Peru 02.1 1-3 CPI Reference rate for  None specified Committee
interbank lending 
(+FOREX)
South Africa 00.1 3-6 CPIX+ Repo rate None specified Committee
Czech R. 98.1 1-3 CPI Repo rate (+FOREX) Medium term horizon4 Committee
Hungary 01.1 2-4 CPI Base rate3 Medium term Committee
Poland 98.4 1.5-3.5 CPI Reference rate  None specified4 Committee
(+FOREX)
Israel 92.1 1-3 CPI BOI interest rate  None specified Committee
(+FOREX)
Philippines 02.1 3-5 CPI Repo rate 2 years Committee
Thailand 00.2 0-3.5 CPI Repo rate (1 day) 2 years Committee
(+FOREX)
Indonesia 00.1 4-6 CPI BI rate (+FOREX) Medium to long-term Committee
Romania 05.3 2.8-3.8 CPI Monetarypolicy rate Medium-term Committee
Turkey 06.1 3-5 CPI Overnight rate5 3 years Committee
Albania 05.1 2-4 CPI Repo rate (1 week) Medium to long-term Committee
Kazakhstan 04.1 16-18 CPI Short-term notes  3 years (cut to 2 years Committee
(28 days) (+FOREX) in 2008)
Slovak Rep.6 05.1 <2 CPI§§ 2 week repo 3 years Committee
Note: A separate appendix provides sources and other details about the contents of this Table.
*    in the 1997 Policy Targets Agreement, CPIX (CPI ex of credit services was targeted); otherwise the target is in terms of the CPI. 
**  Before 2003 the target is in terms of the RPIX (retail price idex, excluding mortgage costs); thereafter the CPI is targeted.
§   The target is in terms of the IPCS or extended national CPI.
§§ The target is in terms of the € area Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP).
+   CPI excluding mortgage costs.
$   In statutes. In Canada the Governor is assisted by a Governing Council that includes Deputy-Governors. In New Zealand the Governor is also assisted by a 
Deputy-Governor, among other senior staff:
1   Normally, these central banks do not intervene in foreign exchange markets but reserve the right to do so. For example, in 2007, the RBNZ intervened twice in June. 
2   Since 2008.
3   Although the exchange rate floats there is a ± 15% corridor, ostensibly in preparation for eventual entry into ERM II.
4   No doubt the policy horizon is somewhat influenced by the requirement of eventual euro adoption.
5   The main rate although other short-term instrument rate are also set by the central bank. Generally avoids intervention other than in exceptional cases.
6   Has hiuned the euro area in 2009. Previously, a member of ERM II.
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Source: Average of total index of transparency as defined in Dincer and Eichengreen (2007), over the period 1998-2005, inclusive.
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The Taylor rule and its variants are named after
John Taylor who depicted US Federal Reserve
Policy as reacting to inflation and output
developments. Orphanides (2007) traces the
intellectual development of the Taylor rule,
which was originally ‘calibrated’ to the
conditions prevailing in the US economy. This
means that Taylor (1993) originally assumed
that the real interest rate that suited the US
economy in the long-run is set at 2 percent, and
that the Fed, consistent with its dual mandate, is
equally concerned with inflation control and
ensuring adequate output and employment.
Hence, the Taylor rule is written:
i = 2 +  + 0.5*( 2) + 0.5* (y y*)
where i is the policy rate of the central bank 
(in the US the fed funds rate), is inflation, 
and (y y*) is the amount of aggregate slack in the
economy, otherwise known as the output gap. 
An alternative way of writing the rule that
highlights the role of inflationary shocks in
influencing the setting of the policy instrument
results in the following expression 
i = 1.5* ( 2) + 0.5* (y y*) + 4
Given a desired real interest rate of 2 percent,
the nominal rate is larger by the amount of
inflation. Next, if the central bank has a 2 percent
inflation target (implicit in the case of a non
inflation targeting central bank like the US
Federal Reserve), inflation that exceeds this target
triggers a nominal interest rate increase one and
half times the amount that inflation exceeds the
target. This is the so-called Taylor principle which
makes clear that excessive inflation can only be
eliminated by effectively raising the real interest
rate as this is the signal of a tighter monetary
policy. Similarly, in the event the economy is
overheating (i.e., y>y*) then the policy rate would
also rise by one half of the amount by which the
output gap is positive. In spite of its simplicity
Taylor (1993) demonstrates that the rule fits well
actual fed funds rate behaviour over the 1987-
1992 period. More recently, Poole (2006) shows
that a slightly modified rule fits the actual fed
funds rate very well over a much longer sample
(1987-2005). Poole, however, is quick to point
out that the US Federal Reserve, while seemingly
acting as if it follows a rule, does not do so in a
slavish fashion as there are several periods when
the rule shown above does not match actual fed
funds behaviour. Periods of financial stress, for
example, prompts the Fed not to act as if it
follows a rule. Instead, a Taylor rule is best viewed
as a heuristic device for understanding the core
ingredients of a monetary policy strategy. 
Needless to say the Taylor rule quickly became
an enormously popular way of summarizing the
essence of the conduct of monetary policy around
the world.38 However, there were several
refinements in how economists generated
evidence based on the Taylor rule.
First, as pointed out in this article, central banks
tend to change the policy instrument directly
under their control in a gradual manner.39 Second,
it is not clear that a central bank places the
weights on the inflation and output gaps assumed
by Taylor. Instead, the weights can be estimated by
allowing the expression above to hold with some
error together with some allowance for gradual
changes in interest rates, known as the interest rate
smoothing phenomenon. Indeed, it is not obvious
that all central banks either have a 2 percent target
or assume a 2 percent real interest rate in mind.
This implies a Taylor rule of the form
where is the interest rate smoothing
parameter, i* and  * are the desired real interest
rate and inflation target, t identifies time,
Appendix B: Taylor Rules 
38 Google Scholar returns 7280 articles about the Taylor rule while EconLit returns 488 items involving the Taylor rule.
39 It is still not entirely understood why. Empirically, the need to gradually influence expectations, uncertainty about future economic conditions,
a desire not to change interest rates too often or for the decision makers to look as if they are constantly flip flopping in their views about the
appropriate setting of policy, are some of the explanations provided. There is perhaps more consensus about theoretical desirability to gradually
change interest rates. See, for example, Woodford (2003), and Sack and Wieland (2000).and     identify the size of the response to
inflation and output gap shocks, and is an
error term. This modified Taylor rule makes
clear that this month or this quarter’s policy rate
is a function of the value set in the last period.
Next, as it concerns inflation targeting central
banks in particular, it is unclear why the central
bank does not instead respond today either to a
forecast or some expectation of future inflation
and the output gap. Here the time horizon 
the central bank has in mind comes into play. 
As a consequence ( *) is replaced by 
Et ( t+1+ *) where Etis the expectation of
inflation i periods ahead, conditional on
information available at time t. A similar
expression could be used to replace the output
gap term in the above equations.40
Since the US is not a small open economy, and
there have also been suggestions that central banks
ought to react to asset prices, variants of the Taylor
rule with interest rate smoothing appeared that
added an exchange rate or some other variable,
such as stock returns. Nevertheless, the broad
consensus is that these variables do not belong in a
Taylor rule for a variety of empirical and
theoretical reasons (see, for example, Clarida
2001; Fuhrer and Tootell 2004).
Finally, one would be remiss if the distinction
between estimated and optimal rules is not
briefly discussed. Versions of the Taylor rule
discussed above did not make reference to
whether the weights, estimated or calibrated,
represent the preferences of the central bank, 
the public, or both. Therefore, without any
knowledge of the objective function of the
central bank – this describes the preferences of
the monetary authority, and the extent to 
which it values deviations of inflation and the
output gap from their respective targets – 
it is difficult to ascertain whose weights the
parameters  and  refer to. Once the 
objective function of the monetary authority is 
defined41 then one can derive a form of the
reaction function that characterizes the weight
the central bank actually places on inflation
versus output outcomes.
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40 A Variety of technical issues arise from such specifications since the expectation of inflation, unless some forecasted value is used, is not
observed. Space limitations prevent a fuller discussion. See, however, Favero (2001).
41 Usually, the objective function is described by a quadratic equation that implies costs to the central bank for missing the inflation target or allowing
the output gap to deviate from zero. In principle, the objective function could also include other variables, such as an interest rate smoothing term t
capture the fact that there are costs to changing interest rates too often or an exchange rate. See, for example, Woodford (2003).Annett, Anthony, Jörg Decressin, and Michael Deppler.
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